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This paper attempts to demonstrate the principles of hermeneutics in an effort to understand 
factors affecting Information Systems (IS) projects. As hermeneutics provides a systematic 
method of interpreting text from multiple information sources, thus, Information Systems 
being prima facie defined and documented as text documents, are eminently suited for this 
mode of investigation. In this paper, we illustrate hermeneutics by analysing a sample case 
study document describing a well known project of Denver International Airport (DIA) 
Automated Baggage Handling System, which was extensively reported in IS and management 
press and studied by Montealegre and his colleagues (Montealegre, Nelson, Knoop, & 
Applegate, 1999, p553-554). As a result of the hermeneutic approach to the analysis of this 
document, a new "flexibility" factor has been discovered to play an important, yet 
unreported, role in the DIA system demise. In the DIA case, the observed flexibility factor 
influenced the quality of the interaction between the actors, the prevailing environment and 
the information systems. 
Introduction 
Although there are several reported Information Systems projects, which have in the past 
applied hermeneutics (Boland, 1991; Klein & Myers, 1999; Myers, 1994a), there are very few 
publications which explain the actual hermeneutic process taken by IS (and in fact, also non-
IS) researchers. What this paper strives to do is close the methodological gap and to present 
one potential framework for the adoption of hermeneutics to the study of Information 
Systems, 
In addition, hermeneutics is often viewed as an "obscure" tool in the IS community because it 
is perhaps not particularly well understood. To that end, this research collects and focuses 
attention on making sense of hermeneutics and its philosophy. 
Making Sense of Hermeneutics 
The Oxford dictionary defines helmeneutics as "of interpretation", taken from the original 
Greek hermeneutikos (Turner, 1987, p284). Hermeneutics as a philosophy of enquiry has 
been well documented with its roots already evident in the late antiquity where "the Greeks, 
the Jews and the Christians had been reading and re-reading their vital texts, namely the 
Homeric epics, the Torah, Tamud and Midrashim, and the Holy Bible, respectively. In the 
process of their textual labour, these people revised their own idiosyncratic sets of rules for 
doing interpretation" (Demeterio, 2001). 
Demeterio gives a useful definition of hermeneutics as "a theory, methodology and praxis of 
interpretation that is geared towards the recapturing of meaning of a text, or a text-analogue, 
that is temporally or culturally distant, or obscured by ideology and false consciousness" 
(2001). 
Thus, the understanding that is sought is found within texts and text-analogues - records that 
have been created by authors. These records might be as prosaic as a report, or as interesting 
as a series of captured electronic mails (Lee, 1994), or even as a set of transcripts of 
interviews and case study notes (Montealegre & Keil, 2000; Montealegre et aI., 1999). In any 
event, these documents purport to represent some sort of reality or truth. 
This search for understanding is influenced by several interesting factors that rely on some 
assumptions that mayor may not be all present and at work at any given time. 
Firstly, understanding can be viewed as an interpretive oscillation between several layers or 
perspectives. This is often referred to as the "hermeneutic circle or cycle", where one 
examines a small fragment of knowledge and seeks to understand it, then looks at the "whole" 
(whatever that means to the enquirer), and seeks understanding there as well - the smaller 
fragment being part of the whole, and the whole being composed of many smaller fragments. 
Understanding, then, is achieved when there is a consistency between the whole and all its 
component parts and vice versa. Or, as stated by Myers (1994b, p191): "This hermeneutic 
process continues until the apparent absurdities, contradictions and oppositions in the 
organization no longer appear strange, but make sense". 
Secondly, if understanding can be described as a stable oscillation between the parts of a 
whole and each individual part exhibiting consistency, then the very act of "searching for 
understanding" would be the actual oscillation or (hermeneutic) cyclic action. As one 
searches for understanding, one acquires a small new piece of knowledge or a minor fact, 
seeks to understand this new piece in itself and also in the context of the already acquired 
knowledge and existing understanding ofthe whole. 
Thirdly, how does one know that understanding has been achieved? The repeated cycling 
between the parts and the whole will eventually yield consistency that is driven by the sum of 
knowledge or data in front of the researcher. Should that knowledge be incomplete, the 
researcher would actually have no way of knowing that fact. The only really useful test 
would be to introduce yet more data or facts and test by hermeneutically cycling through 
again. If the number of resulting cycles are sufficiently small (or even none), then one could 
say that there is understanding, or as Myers (1994b, p191) would have simply said - it 
"makes sense". 
But understanding and the processes of its acquisition must be something more than just the 
end product of a process. Kidder (1997, p1196) cites the seminal philosopher Hans-Georg 
Gadamer on understanding: 
"If I am an English language speaker learning German, for example, I will very likely 
pursue a course of study in which I learn a linguistic apparatus that is neither spoken 
English nor spoken German. I will learn patterns of verb endings, noun cases, systems of 
adjective and noun agreement, and such - categories I may never have applied to 
language before, although I had been speaking language all my life. This apparatus is a 
third thing, a bridge to understanding a language that is not the same as understanding that 
language. When the understanding actually occurs, I recognize it because suddenly the 
apparatus falls away and I simply speak German. So it is with helmeneutic: the 
interpretive process creates something that is neither my horizon nor the others. This third 
thing is a necessary medium; but it is just as necessary that this medium fall away. At this 
point in transcending the apparatus we can say that understanding occurs. There is still, 
however, the quality of a kind of third horizon here; one has not dissolved into the other 
culture; one has not erased one's own horizon; but one's horizon has become entwined 
with another in a unique instance of fusion." (Kidder, 1997, p1196). 
So it can be reasonable to assume then that understanding comes from applying an apparatus 
(or tool) repeatedly over some data until the apparatus or tool becomes superfluous - that is to 
say, some understanding has been reached - because the apparatus is no longer needed. 
Using the Gadamerian analogy, successfully engaging in a conversation with a German would 
validate one's understanding of the newly learnt language - i.e., testing the understanding 
with new untried data. If the conversation is unsuccessful, by whatever criteria, then the 
apparatus is reapplied, learning restmied, and then another test. This is the hermeneutic cycle 
in its simplest form. The act of understanding flows from understanding the whole to 
understanding all the little bits that make up the whole. Then when confronted by a new 
"little bit" that purports to be part of the whole under consideration, if understanding has been 
achieved, then a consistency between the new knowledge and the context of the existing 
whole will be maintained without any conflict (Myers, 1994b, p 191). 
Practical Hermeneutics 
The apparatus that is so critical to achieving/acquiring understanding in Gadamer's case (see 
above) is specially designed to create a bridge between zero understanding and the final goal 
of complete understanding. The apparatus itself is specific to the task at hand. In the use of 
critical hermeneutics in the interpretation of texts (and text analogues), Harvey and Myers 
(1995, p20) quote Paul Ricoeur: 
"In critical hermeneutics the interpreter constructs the context as another form of text, 
which can then, of itself, be critically analysed so that the meaning construction can be 
understood as an interpretive act. In this way, the hermeneutic interpreter is simply 
creating another text on a text, and this recursive creation is potentially infinite. Every 
meaning is constructed, even through the very constructive act of seeking to deconstruct, 
and the process whereby that textual interpretation occurs must be self critically reflected 
upon." (Ricoeur, 1974) 
This research will create, analyse and seek to understand these additional texts on the original 
texts under investigation. 
There are already additional issues to consider. There is a substantial cultural difference 
between an English speaking Californian (say) and a German speaking Berliner. What if we 
are engaging with text rather than a person? What if the text was written 200 hundred years 
ago about things that were important at the time, but have become obscure in the twenty first 
century? 
This "distance" between the hermeneutist (the enquirer) and the author (and text) under 
investigation is referred to as "historicality" by researchers such as Myers (1994b, p189). 
"Critical hermeneutics does emphasize the fact that social reality is historically 
constituted. And one of the key differences between a purely interpretative approach and 
critical hermeneutics is that the researcher does not merely accept the self-understanding 
of participants, but seeks to critically evaluate the totality of understandings in a given 
situation. The researcher analyses the participants' own understandings historically, and 
in terms of changing social structures. The hermeneutic-dialectic perspective, therefore, 
as an integrative approach, emphasizes both the subjective meanings for individual actors 
1 This relates to our later issue on the actual nature of the dialectic whereby we must actively seek all the issues-
both those that are in favour of the argument and those best ones that are against. 
and the social structures which condition and enable such meanings and are constituted by 
them." (Myers, 1994b, p189) 
This concept of historicality has also been called "contextualization" where Klein and Myers 
(1999, p73) refer to Gadamer's (1976, p133) observation: " ... the hermeneutic task consists, 
not in covering up the tension between the text and present, but in consciously bringing it 
out". 
The distance of the investigators from the source text can be manifold. It might be 
combinations of:-
time: the months or years or even millennia since the original text was written; 
language: where the language of the text is no longer in day to day use or has been 
substantially modified; 
culture: where the original text was created by an author within a cultural context 
alien to the investigator; 
intention: where the original text's author set out intentionally to mislead, omit or 
twist events and facts to serve their own ends; 
social milieu: where the prevailing social norms and accepted behaviours of that time and 
place of the text's creation have become forgotten or have changed. 
It is the investigator's responsibility to acknowledge that they have a historicality factor to 
account for and that the text under investigation may well be a puzzle of many dimensions. 
In addition to burdens that come with the text (historicality), there are burdens already 
surrounding the investigator - their prejudices that will colour their own interpretations of the 
text. These prejudices are actually "pre-judgments", expectations of understanding. Butler 
(1998, p288) extends the notion of prejudice by including a reference to Heidegger's (1976) 
notion of "tradition" and suggesting that prejudice is actually a combination of lived 
experiences, tradition and a sort of socialized comfort zone he refers to as "das Man". Butler 
(1998, p288) acknowledges the powerful influence exerted on individuals: 
"According to Gadamer (1975), Tradition influences a social actor's attitudes and 
behavior through authority, and such authority is transmitted through time and history via 
cultural mechanisms. Heidegger (1976) argues that it is the quiet authority of das Man 
(roughly translated as "the they" or "the anyone") which provides reassurance in the face 
of existential turbulence .. The state of being 'situated' or 'tuned' under the sway of das 
Man, (e.g. as operationalized through public opinion or group norms), provides one with 
familiar and comfortable surroundings; self-reflection precipitated by existential 
turbulence (a 'breakdown') shatters this tranquility and brings about an 'unhomliness' 
(Unheimlichkeit) of existence." (Butler, 1998, p288). 
The suggestion espoused by Gadamer that prejudices are a natural attribute of individuals and 
should be accepted and dealt with has been thoroughly demonized by Wolin (2000, p45) 
although the basis for that vitriol is not the philosophical aspect. 
Kidder (Kidder, 1997, p1194) on the other hand takes up the issue of the investigator's 
prejudice as being a useful starting point for the enquiry. He quotes from Augustine that one 
should "identify the clear and obvious meanings first and then use this understanding to make 
sense of the more obscure and confusing passages" (Augustine, 427). Kidder (1997, p1l94) 
goes on to state that "what is clear and obvious to one in reading a text is likely to be a 
function of one's own cultural orientation and one's own prejudices rather than the function 
of some given accessibility of the text". He goes on to say: 
"So where does one begin? If one cannot begin with the obvious, are we to somehow 
begin with the obscure? The answer is that either option is more or less viable, but the 
crucial thing is that one avoids allowing the starting point to control the enquiry. False 
assumptions can be excellent roads to genuine understanding, but only if one is open, in 
the course of interpreting, to the clues that reveal the inadequacy of those assumptions and 
point the way to needed revisions. Thus hermeneutic properly manifests a circular or 
cyclic pattern in its unfolding: the progress of the enquiry returns one to the beginning, 
and the new beginning sets a new course of progress; the interpretation of parts yields a 
conception of the whole, but that conception brings new meaning to the parts, whose 
reinterpretation may again require reconception of the whole, and so on, in a circle that 
would be merely vicious were it not propelled by concrete and cumulative acts of genuine 
understanding (Dilthey, 1990; Schleiennacher, 1819)" (Kidder, 1997, p 1194-5). 
Critical henneneutics is often called the henneneutic-dialectic. There is the dictionary 
definition of "dIalC'ctIc": the art of investigating the truth of opinions, testing of truth by 
discussion, logical disputation (Turner, 1987, p284). The accepted usage of this tenn is taken 
from the original Socratic dialogues. Kidder's (1997, p1l97) explanation of dialectic is 
eloquent: 
"In an ideal Socratic dialogue, no one is in it to win the debate, but everyone is engaged 
together in the search for the very best arguments in support of whatever opinion is being 
considered, along with the very best objections that can be set against those arguments. If 
in the context of a Socratic dialectic, I propose an argument to which no one can respond 
with a substantial objection, it may fall to me to become the objector (and Socrates is 
often put into this situation, particularly with his younger interlocutors). If I discover that 
my objection is more reasonable than my argument than I do a virtuous thing, from the 
point of view of the dialectic, if I immediately abandon my original opinion and seek a 
new one. This sort of reasoning process, then, has everything to do with persuasion, but it 
is not one person persuading another to hold a particular opinion; it is rather a matter of 
putting persuasion into a larger context of enquiry and discovery, allowing the power of 
argument to sway oneself along with the others, and in a way that is open and deeply 
attuned to the reasoning on all sides of an issue." (Kidder, 1997, pI197). 
Critical henneneutic philosophy of enquiry will be brought to bear on the selected case study 
into Denver International Airport (DIA) Baggage Handling System (Montealegre et aI., 1999, 
p553-554) to develop better understanding of the event itself through the supporting 
documents under investigation. The case study is commonly used in Infonnation Systems 
departments to teach issues related to project management, risk assessment, information 
systems strategy, etc. The case is so well known that numerous prejudices and preconception 
about the DIA project have finnly established in the Infonnation Systems community. By re-
analysing the case using critical henneneutics, we were hoping to reveal, to ourselves but also 
to our colleagues and our students, the new horizons of understanding in the roots of the DIA 
project failure. 
Research Method 
In this investigation, we initially reviewed the source document - BAE Automated Systems 
(A): Denver International Airport Baggage-Handing System (Montealegre et aI., 1999) and 
subsequently we performed its analysis focussing on the identification of actors, events, 
environmental factors and some of the authors' possible intentions in leading the readers to 
reach the specific conclusions in the case study. In the process a number of iterative passes 
(cycles) through the document were made. 
1. First cycle is the preliminary reading and developing of the first layer of document 
(and its case) understanding. 
2. Second cycle identifies all the principal actors described in the document. During this 
cycle, the deepening understanding of the case study is documented with each actor 
insights. By actors we consider the people actively engaged in the phenomena 
described in the case study. Actors are instrumental in the outcomes of events, which 
are of special interests to the researchers studying information systems projects. 
3. Third cycle looks at documenting everything that could be considered as background, 
or existing environment surrounding the events under investigation. Understanding of 
these existing environmental factors further reinforce (and in some cases negate) the 
researchers' understanding. 
4. The fourth cycle examines the decisions that were made by actors within their 
respective environments, and the impact of these decisions. The actors' decisions 
indicate the actors' intentions in influencing the events pertaining to the information 
systems development. 
The cycles 1-4 were conducted by one of this article's authors and it resulted in a very 
thorough factual horizon of the DIA case study understanding. Three additional text 
documents were created in the form of tables that summarised and cross referenced the 
original case study. 
The second author at this point of time joined in to provide a completely different view of the 
case, thus developing an alternate horizon, which complemented and in some cases contrasted 
the views and conceptions of the first investigator. The ensuing process of collaborative 
hermeneutics, as we call the use of multiple hermeneutic investigators, introduced into the 
study a richness of views and insights, which then were clashed, deconstructed and eventually 
fused. 
5. The fifth cycle introduces the second investigator's perspective of the events reported 
in the DIA's case study (Montealegre et aI, 1999), to bring some new and independent 
insights. In contrast to the first investigator's approach who immersed himself in the 
events surrounding the DIA case, the second investigator. focused on the 
communicative intentions of the case study authors and on documenting his particular 
interpretations of each "event" described. This approach brings in the dialectic 
perspective to this research by questioning the motivation, bias and prejudice of the 
case study authors. 
6. Finally, another DIA centered document (Montealegre & Keil, 2000) was introduced 
and its contribution to the overall understanding then analysed. The analysis proceeds 
from the classical approach of Gadamer (1976) whereby the movement of 
understanding is from the particular to the whole then back again. 
In the following sections, each of the cycles is described in some detail and examples from 
the DIA case study provided to illustrate the process. 
First Cycle 
The researchers took the approach of reading the Denver International Airport Baggage-
Handling System document (Montealegre et al., 1999) "quickly", as one would when trying 
to determine a document's suitability for a more intensive read. This initial reading created 
an immediate impression and started off the cycles of understanding. 
It is at this early phase of understanding development that the value of critical hermeneutics 
emerges when considering the power and impact that "simple" texts can have. Demeterio 
(2001) wrote about the potential impacts of text ... 
"[ ... ] textuality can be infiltrated with power and forces. that are formally considered 
extraneous to it and practically innocuous. Specifically, Marx argued that textuality can 
be warped by capitalist and class-based ideologies; Nietzsche, by cultural norms; and 
Freud, by the unconscious. These extraneous powers and forces are capable of 
penetrating deep into the text, by weaving into its linguistic fabric. Thus, even without 
the cultural and temporal distances that made romanticist hermeneutics anxious, or even 
without the differences of life-worlds that bothered both phenomenological and dialectical 
hermeneutics, there is no guarantee for the reader to be brought side by side with the 
truth/meaning of a text, because textuality can be veiled by ideology and false 
consciousness. The goal of this hermeneutic system is to diagnose the hidden pathology 
oftexts and to free them from their ideological distortions." (Demeterio, 2001) 
In the DIA case study, the initial reading takes the reader into a summary of the case and 
which also prepares the preliminary understanding. 
The introduction to the case study commences with a summary of the project, describing it as 
being beset by risks: "the scale of the large project size; the enormous complexity of the 
expanded system; the newness of the technology; the large number of resident entities to be 
served by the same system; the high degree of technical and project definition uncertainty; 
and the short time span for completion" (Montealegre et al., 1999, p546). The bylines at the 
head of the case study say that "No airport in the world is as technologically advanced as the 
Denver International Airport" (Montealegre et al., 1999), and then almost as an aside in the 
same headline of the case study - "It's dramatic. If your bag [got] on the track, your bag 
[was] in pieces". 
So before even the preliminary reading has commenced, the reader has already scanned 
enough of the first page of this study and already the mindset has been seeded with notions of 
a highly complex project whose technological demands were so complex that it all went off 
the rails .(sic). The mind of an "experienced reader,,2 by now is thinking about what classic 
project management problems have lead to this disaster. 
The understanding that exists at this preliminary cycle is .already deeply prejudiced and 
biased. Questions have already been (subconsciously) set into the researcher's mind about 
what specific failure points will be identified and where blame might be allocated. After all, 
thinks one researcher, "were appropriate project management controls in place and effective, 
then this disaster simply would not have occurred". 
It is clear in hindsight now that the power of the initial read (or should we say - scan) of the 
main document has set the mood for the interpretation of the remaining document. Thus if the 
authors' original intent was to create a negative atmosphere leading to a classical 
2 The term "experienced reader" is used to describe someone who is moderately well versed in project 
management methodologies and who has seen or read about enough project failures to know of standard failure 
patterns. 
investigation and identification of project management failure, then it was achieved before 
even the first page was turned. 
An initial prejudice had now been set in place. 
Second Cycle 
Here the researchers sought to clearly document and identify each actor in this document, 
noting who they were, what their function/purpose was in the scheme of things, and what in 
particular they did that was of note. As a later exercise we also mapped the number of times 
they were quoted/cited/mentioned in the document. 
This second reading really focused on people and institutions. During this reading we 
highlighted individuals and organizations then transcribed this data into a table. In this table 
we identified dates, who these actors were, and what, if anything, they did on their first 
appearance in this table. Obviously some entries appear regularly throughout the paper so 
only their first appearance and what they did was noted. An example appears in Table 1. 
What is notable in this second cycle is that the researchers decided to formally document all 
actors that could be identified and to note who they were and what they were involved in at 
first glance. This new text, a table of actors, is just our "apparatus" as described by Gadamer 
(Kidder, 1997, P 1196). It is an aid in the hermeneutic cycle. An interesting side effect of this 
process has been the disciplined examination of the original text from the viewpoint of 
documenting all identifiable actors. 
Ref Who When Who is it? What haDDened 
ActO 1 BAE Automatic Systems 1992 Engineering consulting and Awarded contract 
Inc. manufacturing company based in 
Carrollton Texas 
ActO 2 Shareholders 1994/05 Applied pressure on Denver Mayor 
Wellington Webb to intervene in 
Iproiect 
Act03 Denver Business 1994/05 Applied pressure on Denver Mayor 
Community Wellington Webb to intervene in proiect 
Act04 Denver Residents 1994/05 Applied pressure on Denver Mayor 
Weliinqton Webb to intervene in project 
ActO 5 Federal Aviation 1994/05 Applied pressure on Denver Mayor 
Administration Wellington Webb to intervene in project 
Act06 Tenant Airlines 1994/05 Applied pressure on Denver Mayor 
Wellinqton Webb to intervene in proiect 
ActO 7 Concessionaires 1994/05 Applied pressure on Denver Mayor 
Wellinqton Webb to intervene in project 
ActO 8 Wellington Webb 1994/05 Denver Mayor Called in German firm Logplan to assess 
Situation 
ActO 9 Logplan 1994/07 German (consulting?) firm Issued an 11 page report on the system 
Act10 Gene Di Fonso 1983 BAE President 
Act 11 Monte Pascoe 1983 Mayoral candidate and prominent Brought airport issue in as an election· 
Denver attornev issue 
Act12 Dale Tooley 1983 Mayoral candidate Unsuccessful 
Act13 Frederico Pena 1983 Mayoral candidate Successful mayoral candidate - agreed to 
commit to continued expansion of DIA 
Act14 Colorado Forum 1983 Lobby group of 50 of Denver's Urged the continuing commitment to the 
senior executives DIA 
Act15 Loca I voters 1989/05 Denver and Adams counties Voters supported the DIA by a margin of 
62.7% for versus 37.3% aqainst 
Act16 Gail Edmond 1989/05 DIA Administrator Claimed referenda passed on the basis of 
economic benefits jobs etc 
Act17 Cha mber of Commerce 1987 Their leadership Promoting airport relocation 
Act18. Frontier Airlines 1986 Bought by Texas Air 
Table 1 Actors (extract) 
The outcome of the development of the table of actors is a better understanding of the history 
of this project and how it came about, its political basis (the Mayoral elections), its economic 
basis (the importance of Denver as a hub), and a fair amount of negative references to BAE 
and the "work ethic" (as repOlied by Stone and Webster). 
A number of issues became evident and remained unresolved at this phase. Why were United 
Airlines clearly committed to the new airport and their own baggage handling system and 
Continental seem an almost disinterested party? Were the authors of the document trying to 
create an impression that the US airline industry was in disarray? If, as is implied in the 
document, it is a tradition in the USA that each airline looks after its own baggage handling 
system, why did DIA push for a single integrated automated baggage handling system? 
The understanding developed after this cycle has deepened considerably. It is evident that 
project controls and coordination were simply not in place, externally imposed deadlines and 
political imperatives were running roughshod over the management team, and interpersonal 
conflict was surfacing. The overall impression is one of chaos. 
During the creation of this first derivative text document, the researchers became aware of 
deeper factors at work. It was clear that these extra things would reveal themselves during the 
next few cycles. It was like a growing suspicion that there was definitely more to come. 
Third Cycle 
Here the researchers read again through the document extracting and tabulating everything 
that could be construed as environmental facts. The definition of an environment fact used 
when this table was constructed was "any thing or context that would have influence on an 
actor when making their decisions or any thing or context that would force a decision to be 
made". 
An example of this part of the analysis is provided in Table 2. 
The result of this forced cycle enabled the researchers to develop the table of environmental 
factors that could be identified. It became abundantly clear that social, political and economic 
factors played an enormous part in this project. 
Because of the detailed examination of the document, a number of hitherto seemingly 
insignificant factors emerged. Because of the hub nature of the old Stapleton Airport, a local 
storm could congest all air traffic across the United States. Predictions about increases in 
travel demand for the local area appear to have been wrong. Because this was a public works 
program, the local laws stated that there must be 30% of minority owned firms and 6% 
women owned forms participate in the project. And, curiously, the authors gave a detailed 
history of BAE appearing to emphasise its list of failures (e.g. San Francisco Airport baggage 
handling system) while still describing them as the pre-eminent baggage handling developers. 
During the creation of this second derivative text document we found ourselves constantly 
referring back to the first document as a reference. A feeling emerged that the environment in 
which this project was living was quite delicately balanced with considerable demands being 
made on the project by a variety of key stakeholders. What was becoming evident was that it 
appeared that each environmental factor was quite fixed and immovable. 
Ref Date Environment Actors 
Env35 1992 The City did not get the airlines together to ask them what they wanted or what Gene Di Fonso 
they needed to operate. The approach was more along the lines of "we will build 
the apartment building, and then you come in and rent a set of rooms". 
Env36 1992 The direct relationship with BAE was delegated to Working Area 4, which also 
had responsibility for building design efforts such as the people mover, airside 
concourse passenqer bridqe parkinq qaraqe etc. 
Env37 1992 BAE had to change its working structures to conform to DIA's project Gene Di Fonso 
manaqement structure. 
Env38 1992 At the time of BAE commencing work, substantial construction work had already 
been done necessitating in some instances to have the already completed work 
demolished. 
Env39 1992/05 Head of the DIA project team resigns. 
Env40 1992/10 Chief engineer Walter Slinger dies. Walter Slinger 
Env41 1992/10 Gail Edmond takes over the job of chief engineer Gail Edmond 
Env42 1992/10 City council did not give Gail Edmond the same autonomy and power as Walter 
SlinQer - they tied her hands and everybody knew it. 
Env43 1992/10 Just after Slingers death, access to BAE employees to side wide access 
deteriorated as their access was ignored or restricted. 
Env44 1992 City of Denver had denied BAE's original contract because it did not comply with 
minority employment requirements. BAE enga,ged outside contractors instead of 
their own employees. 
Env45 1992 The City of Denver was unable to supply clean power to the airport baggage 
handlinq system. 
Env46 1992 The management team had no prior baggage handling competence or Di Fonso 
experience. They treated the baggage handling system as a public works 
project - like pouring concrete. Access was difficult with contractors out on their 
own - almost anarchy. 
Env47 1992 BAE simply did not respond to the obvious incredible workload that they had. "Project 
Their inexperienced project management vastly underestimated their task. Their Manager" from 
work ethic was deplorable. Stone and 
Webster, 
consultants to 
PMT. 
Table 2 Environments (extract) 
The local laws about the desired mix of minority owned and female owned finns involved in 
public works contracts was flagged as being very inflexible given that BAE was forced to 
change its working structures to conform. 
In addition, the researchers noted that the airport Chief Engineer Walter Slinger seemed to be 
something of a champion of the project and the one who was convinced by BAE that it was 
indeed possible. It seems that Slinger was also instrumental in making the actual construction 
work of the project operate - "He had a lot of autonomy and could get things done". The 
researchers have interpreted this statement as meaning that Slinger was able to make 
substantial decisions alone directly related to the project without reference to higher 
authorities. This was changed once Slinger died and his job was taken over by Gail Edmond 
who was stripped of that autonomy by the Denver City Council and forced to validate all her 
decisions with them. 
By this stage of the hermeneutic cycle, the researchers had created two new texts and were 
evaluating their contributions to the understanding of this case. It was becoming evident that 
the next text, the fourth cycle, would reveal even more about the understanding of the whole 
from its component parts. 
As a reflection it was at this point of the investigation, the creation of this second derived text, 
that the first researcher "suddenly" realised how important Walter Slinger was to the whole 
project. The news of his death, previously overlooked, now had a profound impact from this 
point onwards on the investigation. What was now becoming clearer was that Slinger's 
previous autonomy and flexibility stopped at his death and that Edmonds did not inherit these 
managerial freedoms. 
Fourth Cycle 
This cycle examines the decisions that have been identified in the document. Along with 
these decisions the individuals making the decisions, the decisions themselves, and the 
outcomes are documented. 
Table 3 shows what the decision documentation table looks like. 
Surprisingly, the actual number of documented decisions by the case study's authors only 
numbered 23 odd cases. 
This hermeneutic cycle revealed quite forcibly that Denver started building the airport before 
any airline had officially committed to it. United, in fact, committed to the project in 
December 1992, at the same time as they commissioned BAE to build their own baggage 
handling system. It would appear that when both Continental and United committed to the 
project, there was sufficient flexibility available to make major construction changes to 
airpOli design. 
Ref Date Decision ActorCsl OutcomeLim~acts 
Oec-ll 1992 DIA decided to seek bids to build DIA PMT They contacted 16 companies and of the three who 
an airport-wide baggage system responded neither were considered sUitable. 
Oec-12 1992 DIA approaches BAE to bid OIA PMT BAE developed a proposal for the most complex and 
directly for the airport-wide innovative baggage handling system for the entire 
baaaaae system. a~ort. 
oec-13 1992/04 BAE awarded contract for the OIA PMT $175.6M contract signed. BAE required no changes in 
building of an airport-wide design, and that they would need unrestricted access 
baggage handlinq system. to any place in the airport. 
Oec-14 1992/08 United altered plans for a transfer United Airlines System redesign rrecessitated. 
system for bags changing planes 
Oec-15 1992/09 Continental requested that an Continental Implemented at a cost of $4.67M. 
automated baggage sorter be 
added. 
oec-16 1992/09 Addition of extra maintenance DIA PMT Additional cost of $912,000. 
tracks for servicing of baggage 
carts. 
Oec-17 1993/02 Projected opening of airport Mayor Webb Panic set In. 
delayed from Oct 1993 to 
December then later to March 9 
1994. 
Oec-18 1993/09 BAE loses maintenance contract DIA PMT Industrial action by millwrights and electricians over 
for baggage handling system. BAE's proposal for a lower than union endorsed 
Ipayment. BAE loses maintenance contract. 
Oec-19 1993/09 Projected opening again delayed Mayor Webb 
until May 15 1994. 
oec-20 1994/04 Reporters inVited to witness the Mayor Webb Disaster - everything broke. 
oDeninq 
Oec-21 1994/04 Opening delayed indefinitely. Mayor Webb oelay costs set at $330,000 per month. 
oec-22 1994/05 LogPlan engaged to review the Mayor Webb LogPlan report recommended a backup system be 
baggage handling system and implemented. 
airport. 
Oec-23 1994/08 Back up baggage handling system Mayor Webb $ 50M project. 
announced. 
Table 3 Decisions (extract) 
This cycle also highlights the gaps in communications between the major stakeholders (DIA, 
Continental and United), with the assumption made by DIA that each airline is responsible for 
its own baggage handling system. It is noted that United proceeded to take responsibility for 
its own system because " ... They concluded that the schedule had gotten completely out of 
control from the standpoint of baggage, and they acted to serve their own needs" 
(Montealegre et aI., 1999, p553-554). 
What has been revealed to the researchers by now was that there was a substantial change in 
the project environment with the death of the Chief Airport Engineer Slinger and the 
succession of Gail Edmond with the attendant loss of autonomy and flexibility and (evidently) 
project management skills. 
Fifth Cycle 
In this fifth hermeneutic cycle, the second researcher developed another text based on the case 
study document and sought to interpret the text in terms of key stakeholders and the intentions 
of their communicative actions, and the opinions expressed by the authors_ The researcher 
then includes his interpretation ofthe authors' intentions and opinions_ 
Table 4 provides an extract of authors' intentions_ 
Ref Intention of Stakeholder Opinion Phenomena Researcher's Interp.-etation I 
# Commnnicative Findings 
Action 
Ml Background United Airlines "integrated system would improve Objectives Operational efficiency is an 
1992 time efficiency, reduce close-out important objective. However, 
time for hub operations, and efficiency alone cannot be 
decrease time-consuming manual driving large projects. 
baggage sorting and handling." 
M2 Setting Authors "There were, however, a number of Risks: scale, Projects of huge size and 
expectations Hindsight risks inherent in the endeavor: the complexity, complexity need well tested 
scale of the large project size; the newness, methods. Novelty is usually 
enormous complexity of the granularity incompatible with scale. 
expanded system; the newness of 
the technology; the large number 
of resident entities to be served by 
the same system; the high degree 
of technical and project definition 
uncertainty; and the short time 
span for completion." 
M3 Fact Authors "In August 1994, Mayor Webb Non-delivery, Legal means such as penalties 
Hindsight approved the construction of a breakdown of are not advisable in situations 
Setting backup system. At the same time, communication, which require cooperation. 
expectations he notified BAE of a $12,000-a- start of Whenever there is still some 
day penalty for not finishing the hostilities chance of problem resolution, 
baggage system by DIA's original communication and negotiation 
October 29,1993, completion should be used instead. 
date." 
M4 Novelisation GeneDi "He wondered whether he should Rigidity, lack of If all fails project cancelling the 
Fonso, just cancel the contract and cut his communication, projects may be the only option. 
Setting President of losses, or attempt to negotiate with hostility Negotiating project outcomes in 
expectations BAE the city the support required to face of hostility is also an 
1994 finish the system as specified, option. 
despite the severe deterioration in 
communication and rising 
hostil ity." 
M5 Setting Authors "Could the problem with the Hypothesis: By offering a hypothetical 
expectations Hindsight automated system be overcome smaller size and reason for the project collapse 
with the dedication of additional complexity, early in the teaching case, the 
Leading resources? Given that the system additional authors are likely to lead the 
represented a significant departure resources reader towards these as a 
Appeal to from conventional technology, conclusion. 
technical would reducing its size and 
prowess complexity facilitate resolution of 
the problems that plagued it?" 
M7 Motivation Denver "An aging and saturated Stapleton Perceptions and External pressures could provide 
1980s Airport was increasingly seen as a expectations of positive project motivation,. it 
Setting liability that limited the stakeholders. may however also lead to unduly 
expectations attractiveness of the region to the Strong strong stakeholder expectations, 
many businesses that were flocking motivation for while haste could cause project's 
to it. Delays had become chronic." the project. major problems. 
M8 Colorising Frederico Pena "The airport was to become a Perceptions and Project overselling can elevate 
1986 grandiose project to revive the expectations stakeholder expectations beyond 
Politics Colorado economy and a master common sense. 
showcase for the Public Works 
Department. " 
Table 4 Flexibility Factors (extract) 
The revelations from the fifth cycle show that collaborative hermeneutics can yield 
substantial benefits. In this case, two researchers develop independent derivative texts with 
completely individual approaches to their interpretations. 
The curious result of this textual analysis has been the revelation that a considerable amount 
of the case study seems to be directed at colorizing and novelisation of the reported events, at 
setting the reader's expectations and, from the very beginning, at leading the reader to reach 
very specific conclusions at the end of the case - mainly that the project should have been de-
escalated before its ultimate failure. While many of these writers' strategies can be attributed 
to the intended use of the text in teaching IS students, the selectivity of the text and its clear 
omissions may hint at yet another agenda. In particular, the majority of the case study text 
seems to rely on an interview with the then President and Project Manager for BAE, Gene Di 
Fonso. Much of the substance of Di Fonso's statements seem to be a defence of the BAE 
involvement in the project and an attempt to lay blame for various aspects of the failure on 
everyone else. If the authors' intentions were to direct the reader to sympathise with a 
wronged BAE then that goal has definitely been achieved. 
In the process of "peeling off' the layers of authors' intentions and prejudices, and by 
reconciling the two distinct horizons of understanding as developed by both investigators, 
new observations started to emerge. In particular, we were struck at a large number of issues 
hinting on the inherent rigidity in the project administration and management. 
Fusing the horizons lead further to re-evaluating all the findings collected thus far. In 
particular, in cycles 1 and 2, rigidity andlor flexibility seemed quite irrelevant and nearly all 
observations could have been explained with the violation of the basic laws of project 
management. In cycle 3, gender parity, work practice conformity, imposition of authority and 
autonomy reduction have now been rediscovered, and seen by the researchers as a serious 
decrease in flexibility. 
While some of the inflexibilities could have been attributed to the very nature of the project, 
such as its size, complexity, relative novelty and task granularity, other inflexibility factors, 
such as inflexible business processes, state and project policies, hiring policies, staff and 
contractor duties, schedules and expected deliverables, relationships and alliances, finances 
and contracts, designs, coordination and communication modality, could all only be 
explicated by the inexperienced and unwilling project management. 
The 4th hermeneutic cycle has further enhanced the understanding of the case and revealed 
that while initially there was considerable flexibility in the system as a whole, that flexibility 
was taken away in the later stages of the project - when it was needed most! And that seemed 
to be inextricably linked to the death of Chief Engineer Slinger. 
Sixth Cycle 
In the last project phase, the researchers sought to include additional documents that were 
substantively about the DIA project and to apply the hermeneutic principle of adding new 
knowledge into an existing system of understanding that has already been developed, and 
using Myers notion of making sense (1994a, p 191), to either confirm understanding, or to 
extend the understanding to accommodate the new knowledge. 
The new text document was by Montealegre, titled "De-escalating Information Technology 
Projects: Lessons from the Denver International Airport" (Montealegre & Keil, 2000). The 
goal in the introduction of this new document was to determine if there was any new 
knowledge about the DIA project that has not been previously revealed, and whether this 
knowledge maintains consistency with the understanding built to date. 
The focus of the document was to analyse the project failure from the standpoint of de-
escalation. The first new piece of knowledge was the fact that several government agencies 
(Federal Grand Jury, SEC, Government Accounting Office and the Federal Aviation 
Administration) had started or requested investigations into the project (2000, p424). There 
was no inkling of government dissatisfaction in the original case study. 
This new fact caused us to reassess our understanding about the amount of public concern that 
existed during the latter days of the project. In particular, it made us aware that there must 
have been considerable pressure brought to bear on the management of the project. The 
consequences of this pressure could have been to panic, or take some other course of action. 
The original document describes the Webb administration bringing in external consultants to 
look at the baggage handling system in an almost 'matter of fact' way. There was no 
indication of weight of pressure present at the time. 
The second new piece of knowledge that emerged from the document was that Moody's, the 
credit rating agency, reduced the DIA bonds to level Baa, just one level short of "no-
investment status". This added pressure of dried up funds sources again served to add the 
words "crisis" and "panic" to the prevailing atmosphere. 
The third new addition was that Mayor Webb established a task force to look at alternatives 
that could be deployed with the express purpose of opening the airport as quickly as possible. 
There was no mention of this task force in the case study, even though it preceded the report 
tabled by the Logplan company. This was truly the first piece of evidence of high level 
flexibility being brought to bear on the problem - if a problem becomes intractable, try to get 
around it. 
The news horizons added by this new knowledge provided a relief to the tension that 
developed around what appeared at first sight to be an inflexible administration and 
management. 
Reflections 
It was not until the researchers actually engaged with the original case study document in 
such detail that the real benefits of the hermeneutic investigative process became apparent. 
The detailed creation of the derivative texts that focussed on one perspective at a time forced 
us to review and in a way to confront our own prejudices. 
Each hermeneutic cycle as evidenced by the different perspectives and subsequent derivative 
documents enhanced the understanding. It was as if each text created its own horizon and in 
that process this fusion occurred very quietly. 
The introduction of the second hermeneutic investigator who created another derivative text 
from a completely different perspective allowed an almost three dimensional view of the 
problem. This contribution had the potential to create a conflict not unlike a debate, where 
one seeks a winner. But when the principles of dialectics were enforced, rather than a debate 
ensuing, it seems that fusion occurred, leading to an even broader understanding. 
Another interesting side effect of this collaborative hermeneutics was that each of the 
researchers again had another view of their own prejudices, as well as what turned outto be a 
quite stimulating debate, not on the respective validity of these perspectives, but on the sheer 
value and importance of dialectics. 
The first researcher then wanted to locate and feed every possible available document on the 
Denver International Airport into the investigation just to make sure that nothing had been left 
unchecked and that there were no more hidden reasons for the events that occurred. 
Conclusions 
This article presented a case for the use of critical hermeneutics to the study of IS 
development projects. In particular, the paper used the infamous case study of Denver 
International Airport (DIA) and its Baggage Handling System to illustrate the hermeneutic 
process, its numerous cycles of understanding and the insights gained and recorded as new 
text that could be further analysed and reconciled. 
The approach demonstrated the hermeneutic approach as eminently suited the task of 
analysing IS processes, environment, actors and events - the truly factual aspects of recorded 
project information. The example also showed that the pre-existing text could also be 
screened for prejudices and biases, which may hide the richness of new insights and 
information. 
In the case of DIA, the hermeneutic approach lead to the discovery of new factors, such as 
those related to project inflexibility, which could explain the downfall of the DIA 
development project, but which seem to have eluded the original project investigators, either 
due to unintentional omission, educational objectives of the case, or possibly due to the 
political pressures imposed on the authors by various project stakeholders. 
On reflection, in the course of our study, we came to the conclusion that critical hermeneutics 
can be effectively employed in IS research to determin,e IS project characteristics, to identify 
the associate project events and their actors. It is also a very useful approach to assist IS 
researchers in sifting through the secondary data of biased and prejudiced project reports and 
in peeling off these biases to reveal and interpret the true nature of project events. 
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